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Should Intercultural Philosophy take over from Anthropology in study of culture?1 
Pieter Boele van Hensbroek 
Faculty of philosophy 
University of Groningen 
 
Criticism of Anthropology and self-criticism of the discipline are not new. In fact, since 
the exposure of its role in colonial rule and in fostering Eurocentric prejudice about so-
called ‘primitive’ peoples, Anthropology has developed to be one of the most self-critical 
disciplines in the academia. However, the criticism that professor Wim van Binsbergen 
advances in his recently published book Intercultural Encounters goes beyond all this. 
Himself a distinguished anthropologist of  religion, his fundamental criticism leads him 
to the conclusion to desert the discipline of Anthropology and shift to Intercultural 
Philosophy. Such a criticism deserves careful attention because if it holds, then it cannot 
remain without consequences for the intellectual landscape in the Human Sciences, as it 
would put Intercultural Philosophy central stage in academic concerns with culture.  
The present article investigates whether Anthropology can be repaired after van 
Binsbergen’s criticism. My angle of approach is narrower than van Binsbergen’s. I limit 
myself to considerations from the point of view of Philosophy of Science. 
 
Intercultural Encounters is a captivating book. It recounts van Binsbergen’s personal 
intellectual development through a presentation of his own key publications over a period 
of thirty years. The original texts are enriched with his comments and analyses produced 
today. Intercultural Encounters thus reconstructs the story of van Binsbergen’s discovery 
of a range of internal contradictions in Anthropology. The book mixes the theoretical 
discussion of these methodological issues and Gordian knots of the discipline with the 
personal drama of living through these contradictions. And a drama it is, because both 
professional and personal integrity are at stake. The thirty years of intercultural 
encounters recounted in the book raise not just methodological or professional issues, but 
also political, moral and biographical ones. Finally, in van Binsbergen’s view, it raises 
the question of personal integrity as a person living in an intercultural world. Honesty and 
authenticity in constructing one’s own deepest convictions and relating with cultural 
others in an unprejudiced way requires a rejection of Anthropology and a radical 
conversion towards Intercultural Philosophy. 
The various levels of the argument in Intercultural Encounters can be outlined as follows. 
A first level concerns epistemological and methodological questions related to 
Anthropology, especially anthropological fieldwork. Van Binsbergen discusses these 
with reference to the history of his own intellectual production and his own fieldwork 
experience. At a second level, the book addresses questions of the politics of knowledge 
and the justification of, what he calls, a “North-Atlantic” knowledge practice. The 
hegemonic position of North Atlantic knowledge traditions is itself an issue, but this 
obtains extra weight when these traditions address other parts of the globe. How does this 
North Atlantic knowledge relate to the self-interpretations produced elsewhere? What 
knowledge is produced when, for instance, an ethnographer fully participates in another 
form of life, and how is this knowledge affected when such experiences are reported in 
academic writing? How to decide which interpretations are more valuable? How even to 
                                                 
1 a later version of this article will be published in QUEST, an African Journal of Philosophy. 
reach a situation where both are taken equally seriously? The politics of knowledge thus 
leads to a third level of questions relating to fairness, honesty towards fellow humans, 
and authenticity of oneself. Are the honest and open human relations in the fieldwork 
situation betrayed by having a second agenda of representing the cultural experience in a 
foreign paradigm? Can the anthropologist be true to her/himself when incisive cultural 
experiences, roles played, ands friendships solidified are ignored after the fieldwork 
period in favour of interpretations fitting the regular scientific paradigm? 
Van Binsbergen’s argument is complicated because it addresses all three levels of the 
argument. His conclusion is that Anthropology is seriously problematic at all these levels, 
it is epistemologically naïve, has a knowledge-political bias towards the North-Atlantic, 
and leads to unfaithful attitudes to both one’s fellow humans in the field work situation 
and to oneself. Nevertheless all these elements of criticism connect together into one line 
of reasoning which I will represent below. For van Binsbergen the train of dilemma’s 
have an important biographical dimension as well, because he became himself a locally 
qualified healer in the Southern African tradition of Sangoma. As an anthropologist, such 
experienced as a Sangoma healer is respected, but the discipline expects finally a 
rendering of such fieldwork experiences in terms of regular anthropological theorizing. 
Here van Binsbergen protests, both for personal and for professional reasons. Why should 
he become unfaithful to Sangomahood, his fellow healers and himself, and why should 
the North-Atlantic paradigm of understanding automatically demand precedence?  
 
The core of van Binsbergen’s argument is an epistemological criticism of Ethnography. 
The enterprise of Ethnography is built upon gathering ethnographic data, where fieldwork 
is the instrument and ethnographic monographs and articles are the result. The idea of 
fieldwork is that the foreign context of meaning is captured by immersing oneself into the 
form of life concerned. Thus cultural phenomena can be understood from within the 
cultural context of meaning and can be experienced as they really are, in an ‘emic’ way, 
from within. Having gained understanding of cultural phenomena then the issue is to 
present the results carefully and honestly in academic writing.  
Van Binsbergen points out that, despite all due attention to anthropological 
professionalism and unprejudiced attitudes, the idea of fieldwork is a case of naive 
inductivism. First of all because of the assumption of gaining access to the cultural facts 
as they really are, second, because of the assumption that the framing of these findings in 
academic textual forms is not distorting. Anthropologists tend “to improvise their way 
when it comes to epistemological and methodological foundations”. (497). If both the 
problems of access and of representation were given due attention, then we would have to 
move to different modes of intercultural knowledge production instead of Anthropology, 
he argues. 
As for the problem of access, the empiricist claim ignores the constructivist aspect of 
empirical science and experience in general. There cannot be a complete shedding one’s 
original mindset, linguistic conditioning and cultural attitudes. On top of that, by 
formulating the specific research questions and scope of ones study, choosing concepts 
and theories, and other study-specific arrangements the observer adds to the construction 
of the object of research. Even with a completely emic approach, including the 
continuous validation of the ethnographer’s interpretations in day to day acting and 
communication of a community, one cannot claim to reach an unproblematic, untainted 
understanding. We need to replace a classical objectivist model of knowledge acquisition, 
where the subject gains unproblematic access to the object, with a communicative model, 
where the people studied can ‘speak back’ and interpretations are questioned, confirmed 
or adjusted. In the words of van Binsbergen: “Ethnographers (…) can only claim 
credibility provided that, in their fieldwork and in the production of published texts, 
ample provision has been made to turn their ethnography into a form of ‘communicative 
action’.” (504) 
As for the problem of the representation of findings in academic vocabulary, using 
scientific notions and following textual forms that are standard in the discipline, here too 
Anthropology has naïve assumptions, according to van Binsbergen. He describes this act 
of representation as a certain form of appropriation, of aggression, and of expressing 
power differences. Ethnography ignores these problems. Van Binsbergen argues that, in 
fact, Ethnography is not even neutral but is based upon a preliminary choice for North 
Atlantic worldviews. Where beliefs and interpretations under study differ from the North 
Atlantic worldview, there the last one remains unchallenged and the worldview under 
study needs to be explained in terms of what is considered sensible in the North Atlantic. 
For instance in the case of witchcraft, the standard idea of the non-existence of witches is 
not questioned, it is only the other side which comes under scrutiny; it is the witch-belief 
that needs to be explained from factors that are acceptable in the North Atlantic. 
Thus, the epistemological criticism immediate results in a knowledge-political argument, 
because if access and reporting are less than neutral, then of course questions arise as to 
whose biases and paradigms dominate the knowledge process. Van Binsbergen calls 
ethnography ‘eurocentric’ because it does not treat the collective representations of other 
cultures on a par with the North Atlantic ones. The representations that have to be 
explained, that are put into question, are always those of the society studied. Those of our 
own are not questioned, they are even taken as the criterion for identifying what needs to 
be explained in the foreign culture. The explanatory vocabulary is automatically that of 
the North Atlantic. Thereby, basic norms of openness and fairness in intercultural 
communication are breached, and the hegemonic position of North Atlantic paradigms is 
confirmed. The unreflective representation in academic texts is then a case of 
“subordinating objectification”. 509’ 
Moral questions also derive immediately from this argument. The asymmetrical situation 
the participant observer is unfaithful to the communicative interaction and shared 
experiences within the community. The dishonesty is that the participations in the 
community and personal interactions are, finally, only instrumental. It is a practice of 
“joining them in the field and betraying them outside the field” (507). Finally, the persons 
in the host community are not taken seriously, social roles and friendships are betrayed 
and the full meaning in the local life is sacrificed to a rendering in academic formats. In 
addition, van Binsbergen maintains, the ethnographer is dishonest to him/herself. 
Authentic experiences of oneself may be ignored or denied. In the case of van 
Binsbergen´s experience as a Sangoma healer this was a vital observation, because he 
considered it betrayal to his own authentic experiences and the Sangoma worldview to 
practice the expected professional distancing in order to fit this Sangoma truth into an 
acceptable ethnographic format. 
 
I will here investigate van Binsbergen’s argument only from the point of view of 
Philosophy of Science. For that purpose I first try to locate the problems he raises within 
the range of issues addressed in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.  Van Binsbergen’s 
criticism raises in particular two kinds of issues. First, the problem of the outsider gaining 
access to, or understanding of, the meaningfull behaviour of others. Within this problem 
domain, van Binsbergen accuses ethnographers of naive empiricism (regarding the status 
of fieldwork data and regarding possible distortions in framing cultural data/experiences 
in academic formats and vocabularies). The second problem area concerns the theoretical 
framework of the interpreter her/himself. Within this problem domain, van Binsbergen 
accuses ethnographers of an uncritical attitude towards their own, North Atlantic 
knowledge practice and metaphysical assumptions.  The first point relates directly to van 
Binsbergen’s moral complaint about Anthropology, the second relates to the knowledge-
political complaint concerning the hegemonic attitude of North-Atlantic academic 
paradigms. 
 In view of these problem domains, I ask the question whether the failings that van 
Binsbergen accuses ethnography of are necessarily part of the discipline (and should thus 
lead to abandoning it), or can be overcome by a more sophisticated practice of the 
discipline (and should thus lead to a repair operation). I am not concerned with the factual 
question of whether anthropologists sometimes, frequently, or even always commit the 
crimes indicated. After all, van Binsbergen’s argument does not build on such a factual 
statement but on the principled one that ethnography is a misguided enterprise. 
 
The possibility of a sophisticated cultural hermeneutics 
 
The issues of understanding cultural others in Ethnography can be placed in the general 
chapter in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences concerned with the interpretation of 
thought and action, the chapter of Hermeneutics. Such questions of interpretation become 
especially urgent when it concern interpretation across boundaries of time (as in the 
historical sciences) and culture (as in Anthropology). In how far, and with what 
methodological precautions, is such interpretation possible? In how far will our own 
vocabularies, agendas and paradigms always distort results? And can such interpretations 
of the foreign, the ‘other’, really challenge our own theoretical and metaphysical 
assumptions? These questions have been discussed in highly interesting work in 
Philosophy, the Theory of History, and in the Theory of Cultural Studies. From these 
discussions I will tap to assess van Binsbergen’s argument. 
A preliminary observation is necessary here. For interesting discussions of these 
fundamental methodological questions we have to turn to the philosophically more 
sophisticated discussions on the Social Sciences and History. Such discussions take 
seriously the fact that acting human beings, the objects of study, are themselves 
interpreting their own actions, and do so within a specific historical context of action. We 
cannot understand their action without grasping the interpretations that actors themselves 
have of their situation. This self-interpretation of social actors raises the issue of the 
'double hermeneutics' involved in doing Social Science. The academic analyst interprets 
human action, but the action cannot be understood without, again, interpreting the self-
interpretation of these actors. It does not suffice to explain human action from a purely 
third-person point of view, referring to objective factors such as calculable benefits, 
dangers, and possibilities in the situation. We need to trace how the actors themselves 
perceived these benefits, dangers and possible courses of action. Thus, we have to 
recover the intentionality of the action, as we say in the Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences. Of course one can try to model human action and motivation, for instance by 
assuming that humans are use-maximalist or that they have a certain standard 
understanding of their world. This can often be a useful strategy for practical purposes 
and is used in much social science research, but it is a shortcut, avoiding the difficult 
issue of reconstructing people’s life-world and motivations. 
 Motivations and interpretations of actors are not directly assessable by 
observation. That makes Social Science a difficult science. The work to be done is 
hermeneutics, the reconstruction of the meaning of the action or ideas concerned through 
understanding the context of meaning, the life-world of the actors and (in the case of 
individual actions) the specific intervention that the person under study intends to make. 
Different strategies of hermeneutics have been tried. A basic difference concerns, for 
instance, hermeneutics conceived of as empathy, as a psychological identification with 
the actors concerned, or hermeneutics conceived of as the reconstruction of contexts of 
meaning, as an almost linguistic exercise. 
 Anthropological fieldwork is a hermeneutical technique. The immersion in the 
other cultural context which is pursued creates a very low threshold for gaining 
understanding, and the participation in actual interaction provides “a unique function of 
validation”, as van Binsbergen calls it, because the appropriateness of the interpretation is 
immediately put to test in actual social action and communication. (496). At the same 
time, van Binsbergen warns that it is naïve to assume that fieldwork therefore results in 
unproblematic and reliable data and interpretations. Despite anthropological techniques, 
the paradigms, assumptions and biases of the fieldworker who is coming from a different 
society cannot be blotted out. The questions of getting a good grasp of the data and of 
attaining sufficient fit of ones interpretations with the data are still on the agenda. The 
unavoidable constructive activity of the observer makes that the validity of the fieldwork 
results cannot be assumed. Van Binsbergen’s conclusion is that, finally, validation 
“cannot be done without involving them”, i.e. the actors. 
I make two observations at this point. First I would note, contrary to van Binsbergen, that 
this kind of hermeneutics is not basically a moral issue. Trying to recover people’s 
interpretations and swapping between the roles of participant and analyst (insider and 
outsider) is not wrong as such. The whole idea of studies across cultural boundaries can 
be viewed as an attempt to move, in some way, understanding of social or mental 
phenomena from cultural context A to context B (say from the Azande to Western 
Europe). This exercise may involve for the investigator playing different roles in A and 
B. But it is symmetrical in the sense that an investigator from context A would have to 
make similar moves, but then starting from the other side, when investigating cultural 
context B. 
 The hot issue in understanding across boundaries is the quality of the 
understanding, namely the issue how we can be sure that our interpretations actually fit 
the meanings of action and ideas of the actors themselves. In Historiography this problem 
of ‘fit’ appears for instance in the problem of ‘anachronism’. We easily make sense of 
observations by projecting our own mode of understanding onto the data. Sometimes 
such an interpretation can clarify a range of other phenomena and thus seem a successful 
explanation. Nevertheless, it will still be deficient if the interpretation assumes on the part 
of the actors information, understanding, concepts or motivations that they could not 
possibly have had. Just like historians applying anachronistic interpretations, 
investigators of culture may apply interpretations to cultural actors that they could not 
have shared.  
 Thus, the issue in studies of culture is if the interpretation finally produced by the 
analyst (in an academic language) can plausibly 'fit' with that of the actors. The historian 
Quentin Skinner provides a sophisticated discussion of this problem in his famous article 
“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”. Skinner notes that approaching the 
material with preconceived paradigms is both inescapable and dangerous. It is 
inescapable, for instance, because of the vantage point, and the linguistic, theoretical and 
problem contexts from which the observer engages in the research. There is, for instance, 
always a tendency to apply ones own familiar criteria of classification and discrimination. 
The observer “may ‘see’ something apparently …  familiar … and may in consequence 
provide a misleading familiar-looking description” (45). Also, “the observer may 
unconsciously misuse his vantage point in describing the sense of the given work” (47).  
 According to Skinner, there may always be different interpretations rendering the 
facts, however, these should at least be compatible with what the meaning of the action 
could have been for the actor. Thus, there is a strong negative requirement, namely to 
“exclude the possibility that an acceptable account of an agent’s behaviour could ever 
survive the demonstration that it was itself dependent on the use of criteria of description 
and classification not available to the agent himself”. Notions, ideals and motivations 
etcetera that were not available in the context of action of the agent cannot have been part 
of his motivation. He states the positive equivalent of this requirement as: “any plausible 
account of what an agent meant must necessarily fall under, and make use of, the range of 
descriptions which the agent himself could at least in principle have applied to describe 
and classify what he was doing”. This “in principle” is vital especially for the historical 
sciences. It cannot be more than a hypothetical test to what the motivations or views of 
the agent could at all have included.  
In another formulation, Skinner states that: “no agent can eventually be said to have 
meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct 
description of what he had meant or done.” Interestingly, Skinners criterion for an 
acceptable interpretation gives the objects of research the right, in principle, to respond, 
to speak out. Although, like in the case of history, this is a hypothetical or virtual 
response, there is some ‘speaking back’. Skinner seems to indicate here requirements for 
a hermeneutical approach that avoids the criticisms of naïve empiricism that van 
Binsbergen directs at Anthropology. This suggests that Anthropology can, at least in this 
respect, in principle be repaired. In Action Research approaches to Social Science this 
element of ‘speaking back’ of the agent, the check of the investigated actors, is given a 
central place. 
 
The second problem domain in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences which van 
Binsbergen addresses is that of the status of North Atlantic theoretical and metaphysical 
frameworks. Van Binsbergen accuses Anthropology of uncritical acceptance of such 
frameworks. Again, my discussion is limited to the question if such uncritical acceptance 
is inherent in the discipline and again my conclusion is that with a more sophisticated 
hermeneutical approach the weaknesses of Anthropology may be repairable.  
 In order to present a more sophisticated version of Social Science, I refer to the 
interesting views of what may be called the father of modern hermeneutics, namely Hans-
Georg Gadamer. In his view of hermeneutics, Social Science is necessarily a self-
questioning tradition, a process of self-reflection, of attaining self-knowledge. At the 
same time, however, the specific historically and culturally situated character of Social 
Science knowledge is not something that can be overcome, because it is part of our 
human condition. 
 In Gadamer's view, any hermeneutics necessarily involves a "Vorverständnis" (a 
pre-understanding) by the interpreter of the object. Again, because this Vorverständnis 
changes over time (if only through the results of academic works of interpretation, but 
also because of cultural and political processes of change), hermeneutics is, finally, a 
never ending process. Hermeneutics throws light on the object of research in ever new 
ways, from an ever shifting starting position. Hermeneutics in this philosophical form is 
an exercise of always redefining our relation to the historically (or culturally) ‘others’. In 
this sense, it is an indirect way of questioning ourselves, of attaining self-knowledge.  
The history of the anthropological study of “traditional systems of thought” may illustrate 
that Anthropology may learn something from Gadamer and that investigations in the 
Vorverständniss involved would have helped. One can think here, for instance, of Claude 
Lévy-Bruhl who analysed the difference between ‘primitive’ thought and science in 
terms of the mental make-up of the humans involved. Or of Evans Pritchard whose final 
assessment of the knowledge system of the Zande people, in his famous study Whichcraft 
and Oracles among the Azande, is that Zande thought is not based upon fact, as, 
supposedly, Western science is. Or of Robin Horton's assessment of indigenous 
knowledge systems as being 'closed', i.e. not aware of different knowledge systems and 
not exposed to a process of criticism, as supposedly Western science is. In its own 
hyperbolic way, this history of western theorizing tells more about shifting views of 
Anthropologists themselves than it tells about the others, the ‘primitives’. Part of the 
implicit Vorverständniss is a constantly shifting conception about what Western thought 
or Western science is. From Lévy-Bruhls idea of western man with a scientific mental 
make-up, to Evans Pritchard’s positivistic idea of science as based on fact and Horton’s 
Popperian idea of science as critical rationality. It could be noted that subsequent 
developments in Science Studies, which stress the social construction of knowledge, 
again suggest different interpretations of the thought of cultural others. 
This example confirms van Binsbergen accusation of anthropologists’ uncritical 
acceptance of  North-Atlantic paradigms. However, it also shows that a more critical, 
hermeneutical approach to Social Science that takes note of Gadamer’s reflections upon 
hermeneutics would include a clearly self-reflective element. So again, my conclusion is 
that the failures that van Binsbergen indicates are not inherent in the discipline. 
Anthropology may at first sight seem a one-sided process of subjecting others to ones 
interpretations, it seems possible, however, to practice a hermeneutically sophisticated 
Anthropology which involves both dialogical elements in advancing interpretations and a 
self-reflective attitude towards western paradigms.  
 
 
II. The Challenge of Intercultural Knowledge Production 
 
The previous argument addresses van Binsbergen’s conclusions as to Anthropology, 
however, it does not yet do justice to the broad and challenging problematic which he 
advances so forcefully, namely the future of intercultural knowledge construction. Even 
when we conclude that Anthropology as a discipline does not need to be discarded on 
methodological grounds, then it could still be valid to argue on other grounds that we 
need to advance to new forms of knowledge production which better fit the present 
globalised intercultural world. Van Binsbergen’s effort to table the issue of the 
production of knowledge about culture (as well as his related attack on the idea of 
cultures as distinct units of analysis) is a very important one. On the one hand, in studies 
of culture we are still struggling with a complicated colonial heritage, and on the other 
hand contemporary processes of cultural globalization cry out for strengthening of the 
cultural impact (‘cultural citizenship’) of intellectuals in the South. 
 In van Binsbergen’s account, the road towards truly intercultural knowledge 
production involves replacing Anthropology by Intercultural Philosophy, thus 
substituting a communicative knowledge practice that avoids asymmetries for a naively 
inductive and hegemonic one. This is a challenging, revolutionary project which raises 
question both about the knowledge practice that is deserted, namely Anthropology, and 
about the one adopted, namely Intercultural Philosophy. I will conclude my making a few 
remarks about both. 
 
I would suggest that intercultural knowledge production today requires both 
Anthropology and Philosophy. Anthropology in sophisticated hermeneutical forms as 
illustrated above, but also Anthropology expanded. This need for expansion derives from 
a concern with the political economy of knowledge, rather than with epistemological, 
political and moral criticisms as raised by van Binsbergen. We have to raise questions 
about who produces knowledge, where, addressing what questions, and in the framework 
of which projects or objectives? From this point of view, anthropological studies should 
be conducted by both Northerners and Southerners, locating the studies both outside and 
within the North Atlantic and contributing with their studies to critical assessments of 
views held in their own cultural context. Such an expanded agenda for Anthropology 
involves what could be called a counter-Anthropology which may focus on the North 
Atlantic, or may be practiced by those from outside the North Atlantic. As such this is not 
so new. Studying pockets of Western societies with anthropological methods, even 
anthropological studies of scientific research communities, are already done, and 
contribute much to a more realistic understanding of the West and of science. The 
importance of a focus on the political economy of knowledge production is that a 
renewed and truly intercultural knowledge production cannot be expected without 
addressing the incredible global imbalances, in terms of dominance of western paradigms 
as well as in more material terms of who produces knowledge and discourses, where and 
in what social and cultural environments. With almost all centres of knowledge 
production located in the North Atlantic, the cultural biases observed by van Binsbergen 
in Anthropology may simply be repeated in the new discipline of Intercultural 
Philosophy. 
 With a more sophisticated anthropological practice as a first leg of intercultural 
knowledge production, and counter-anthropologies as the second, then Intercultural 
Philosophy may be the third. But what is this thing Intercultural Philosophy?   
 For van Binsbergen, the basic attraction of Intercultural Philosophy is that it is 
basically a communicative, dialogical form of knowledge production. It does not involve 
the model of the subject gaining knowledge about the object. Philosophy seems to based 
upon interaction and equality. Such statements about Philosophy tend to be highly 
idealistic, as if suddenly power-free communication reigns if we pretend to be 
philosophers, and as if we can rise above the violence, commercial interest and 
manipulations which shape the world of discourse and power. To seek the advantages of 
Intercultural Philosophy in that direction would certainly be mistaken. However, 
Philosophy is a different form of discourse from the Social Sciences, where reflexivity 
about such methodological problems as related to acquiring knowledge and 
representation of knowledge in the framework of theories (van Binsbergen’s two basic 
methodological criticisms of Anthropology) receive all attention. Furthermore, the basic 
form of interaction in Philosophy is discussion, which may facilitate better the dealing 
with knowledge-political issues. Hegemonic positions and cultural biases, which 
certainly will always be there, will more easily be challenged in Philosophy. 
Noot: 
Two questions relating to Intercultural Philosophy remain unaddressed by van 
Binsbergen. First of all, it remains unclear how the Intercultural Philosophy can include 
empirical studies, Philosophy being that addresses presuppositions as well as 
consequences of empirical studies, but not an empirical discipline itself.. Second, van 
Binsbergen did not explain why a new type of Philosophy, Intercultural Philosophy, 
should be invented to be the vehicle of intercultural knowledge production. Given his 
own argument that “Cultures do not exist”, it does not seem to make sense to speak of 
intercultural relations as if cultures exist, after all, are identifiable units. Rather, we would 




The assessment of van Binsbergen’s argument in this paper suggests some diversion from 
his own conclusion. His epistemological, knowledge-political and moral arguments do 
not force us to discard Anthropology all together. Rather, a hermeneutically more 
sophisticated and self-reflexive Anthropology is called for. At the same time, van 
Binsbergen’s greater objective of establishing a truly intercultural knowledge production 
can itself be strengthened by considerations about the political economy of knowledge 
production. Intercultural knowledge production requires that the actual production of 
cultural knowledge is democratized and ‘decentered’ all over the globe. This is a 
necessary basis for counter discourses and for a challenging Anthropology, or counter-
Anthropology. Finally, it remains unclear in van Binsbergen’s argument in how far 
Intercultural Philosophy can actually do the job and also include empirical study of 
culture. The argument in this article suggests that a much greater role of Philosophy 
(Intercultural Philosophy if you like) is called for in intercultural knowledge production. 
Firstly in order to put conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues much more in the 
forefront of discussions than is presently the case, and secondly in order to foster 
communicative modes of knowledge which can make knowledge production about 
culture itself an intercultural exercise. 
 
 
